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Abstract—A new generalised approach for multiple correlated
sources over a wiretap network is investigated. A basic model
consisting of two correlated sources where each produce a
component of the common information is initially investigated.
There are several cases that consider wiretapped syndromes
on the transmission links and based on these cases a new
quantity, the information leakage at the source/s is determined.
An interesting feature of the models described in this paper is the
information leakage quantification. Shannon’s cipher system with
eavesdroppers is incorporated into the two correlated sources
model to minimize key lengths. These aspects of quantifying
information leakage and reducing key lengths using Shannon’s
cipher system are also considered for a multiple correlated source
network approach. A new scheme that incorporates masking
using common information combinations to reduce the key
lengths is presented and applied to the generalised model for
multiple sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Keeping information secure has become a major concern
with the advancement in technology. In this work, the infor-
mation theory aspect of security is analyzed, as entropies are
used to measure security. The system also incorporates some
traditional ideas surrounding cryptography, namely Shannon’s
cipher system and adversarial attackers in the form of eaves-
droppers. In cryptographic systems, there is usually a message
in plaintext that needs to be sent to a receiver. In order
to secure it, the plaintext is encrypted so as to prevent
eavesdroppers from reading its contents. This ciphertext is then
transmitted to the receiver. Shannon’s cipher system (men-
tioned by Yamamoto [1]) incorporates this idea. The definition
of Shannon’s cipher system has been discussed by Hanawal
and Sundaresan [2]. In Yamamoto’s [1] development on this
model, a correlated source approach is introduced. This gives
an interesting view of the problem, and is depicted in Figure 1.
Correlated source coding incorporates the lossless compres-
sion of two or more correlated data streams. Correlated sources
have the ability to decrease the bandwidth required to transmit
and receive messages because a syndrome (compressed form
of the original message) is sent across the communication links
instead of the original message. A compressed message has
more information per bit, and therefore has a higher entropy
because the transmitted information is more unpredictable. The
unpredictability of the compressed message is also beneficial
in terms of securing the information.
Encoder Decoder
X,Y W
Wiretapper
Wk
Key Generator
Source
XˆYˆ
Figure 1. Yamamoto’s development of the Shannon Cipher System
The source sends information for the correlated sources,
X and Y along the main transmission channel. A key Wk, is
produced and used by the encoder when producing the cipher-
text. The wiretapper has access to the transmitted codeword,
W . The decoded codewords are represented by X̂ and Ŷ . In
Yamamoto’s scheme the security level was also focused on
and found to be 1KH(X
K , Y K |W ) (i.e. the joint entropy of
X and Y given W , where K is the length of X and Y ) when
X and Y have equal importance, which is in accordance with
traditional Shannon systems where the security is measured
by the equivocation. When one source is more important than
the other then the security level is measured by the pair of the
individual uncertainties ( 1KH(X
K |W ), 1KH(Y K |W )).
In practical communication systems links are prone to
eavesdropping and as such this work incorporates wiretapped
channels, i.e. channels where an eavesdropper is present.
There are specific kinds of wiretapped channels that have
been developed. The mathematical model for this Wiretap
Channel is given by Rouayheb et al. [3], and can be explained
as follows: the channel between a transmitter and receiver
is error-free and can transmit n symbols Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
from which µ bits can be observed by the eavesdropper and
the maximum secure rate can be shown to equal n − µ bits.
The security aspect of wiretap networks have been looked
at in various ways by Cheng et al. [4], and Cai and Yeung
[5], emphasising that it is of concern to secure these type of
channels.
Villard and Piantanida [6] also look at correlated sources
and wireap networks: A source sends information to the
receiver and an eavesdropper has access to information corre-
lated to the source, which is used as side information. There is
a second encoder that sends a compressed version of its own
correlation observation of the source privately to the receiver.
Here, the authors show that the use of correlation decreases
ar
X
iv
:1
40
1.
62
64
v1
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
 O
ct 
20
14
2the required communication rate and increases secrecy. Villard
et al. [7] explore this side information concept further where
security using side information at the receiver and eavesdrop-
per is investigated. Side information is generally used to assist
the decoder to determine the transmitted message. An earlier
work involving side information is that by Yang et al. [8].
The concept can be considered to be generalised in that the
side information could represent a source. It is an interesting
problem when one source is more important and Hayashi and
Yamamoto [9] consider it in another scheme, where only X
is secure against wiretappers and Y must be transmitted to
a legitimate receiver. They develop a security criterion based
on the number of correct guesses of a wiretapper to retrieve
a message. In an extension of the Shannon cipher system,
Yamamoto [10] investigated the secret sharing communication
system.
In this case, we generalise a model for correlated sources
across a channel with an eavesdropper and the security as-
pect is explored by quantifying the information leakage and
reducing the key lengths when incorporating Shannon’s cipher
system.
This paper initially describes a two correlated source model
across wiretapped links, which is detailed in Section II. In
Section III, the information leakage is investigated and proven
for this two correlated source model. The information leakage
is quantified to be the equivocation subtracted from the total
obtained uncertainty. In Section IV the two correlated sources
model is looked at according to Shannon’s cipher system. The
notation contained in the tables will be clarified in the follow-
ing sections. The proofs for this Shannon cipher system aspect
are detailed in Section V. Section VI details the extension
of the two correlated source model where multiple correlated
sources in a network scenario is investigated. There are two
subsections here; one quantifying information leakage for the
Slepian-Wolf scenario and the other incorporating Shannon’s
cipher system where key lengths are minimized and a masking
method to save on keys is presented. Section VII explains how
the models detailed in this paper are a generalised model of
Yamamoto’s [1] model, and further offers comparison to other
models. The future work for this research is detailed in Section
VIII and the paper is concluded in Section IX.
II. MODEL
The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X
and Y are mutually correlated random variables, depicted
in Figure 2. The alphabet sets for sources X and Y are
represented by X and Y respectively. Assume that (XK , Y K)
are encoded into two syndromes (TX and TY ). We can write
TX = (VX , VCX) and TY = (VY , VCY ) where TX and TY are
the syndromes of X and Y . Here, TX and TY are characterised
by (VX , VCX) and (VY , VCY ) respectively. The Venn diagram
in Figure 3 easily illustrates this idea where it is shown that
VX and VY represent the private information of sources X
and Y respectively and VCX and VCY represent the common
information between XK and Y K generated by XK and Y K
respectively.
The correlated sources X and Y transmit messages (in the
form of syndromes) to the receiver along wiretapped links.
XK Y K
TYTX
XˆK , Yˆ K
Encoder Encoder
Decoder
Figure 2. Correlated source coding for two sources
VX VY
VCX VCY
X Y
TX = (VX , VCX) TY = (VY , VCY )
Figure 3. The relation between private and common information
The decoder determines X and Y only after receiving all of
TX and TY . The common information between the sources are
transmitted through the portions VCX and VCY . In order to
decode a transmitted message, a source’s private information
and both common information portions are necessary. This
aids in security as it is not possible to determine, for example
X by wiretapping all the contents transmitted along X’s
channel only. This is different to Yamamoto’s [1] model as
here the common information consists of two portions. The
aim is to keep the system as secure as possible and these
following sections show how it is achieved by this new model.
We assume that the function F is a one-to-one process
with high probability, which means based on TX and TY we
can retrieve XK and Y K with minimal error. Furthermore, it
reaches the Slepian-Wolf bound, H(TX , TY ) = H(XK , Y K).
Here, we note that the lengths of TX and TY are not fixed, as
it depends on the encoding process and nature of the Slepian-
Wolf codes. The process is therefore not ideally one-to-one
and reversible and is another difference between our model
and Yamamoto’s [1] model.
The code described in this section satisfies the following
inequalities for δ > 0 and sufficiently large K.
Pr{XK 6= G(VX , VCX , VCY )} ≤ δ (1)
Pr{Y K 6= G(VY , VCX , VCY )} ≤ δ (2)
H(VX , VCX , VCY ) ≤ H(XK) + δ (3)
H(VY , VCX , VCY ) ≤ H(Y K) + δ (4)
3H(VX , VY , VCX , VCY ) ≤ H(XK , Y K) + δ (5)
H(XK |VX , VY ) ≥ H(VCX) +H(VCY )− δ (6)
H(XK |VCX , VCY ) ≥ H(VX) +H(VCY )− δ (7)
H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY ) ≥ H(VX) +H(VCY )− δ (8)
H(VCX) +H(VX)− δ ≤ H(XK |VCY , VY )
≤ H(X)−H(VCY ) + δ (9)
where G is a function to define the decoding process at the
receiver. It can intuitively be seen from (3) and (4) that X and
Y are recovered from the corresponding private information
and the common information produced by XK and Y K .
Equations (3), (4) and (5) show that the private information and
common information produced by each source should contain
no redundancy. It is also seen from (7) and (8) that VY is
independent of XK asymptotically. Here, VX , VY , VCX and
VCY are disjoint, which ensures that there is no redundant
information sent to the decoder.
To recover X the following components are necessary: VX ,
VCX and VCY . This comes from the property that XK cannot
be derived from VX and VCX only and part of the common
information between XK and Y K is produced by Y K .
Yamamoto [1] proved that a common information be-
tween XK and Y K is represented by the mutual information
I(X;Y ). Yamamoto [1] also defined two kinds of common
information. The first common information is defined as the
rate of the attainable minimum core VC (i.e. VCX , VCY in
this model) by removing each private information, which is
independent of the other information, from (XK , Y K) as
much as possible. The second common information is defined
as the rate of the attainable maximum core VC such that if we
lose VC then the uncertainty of X and Y becomes H(VC).
Here, we consider the common information that VCX and VCY
represent.
We begin demonstrating the relationship between the com-
mon information portions by constructing the prototype code
(WX , WY , WCX , WCY ) as per Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: For any 0 ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K,
there exits a code WX = FX(XK), WY = FY (Y K),
WCX = FCX(X
K), WCY = FCY (Y K), X̂K , Ŷ K =
G(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ), where WX ∈ IMX , WY ∈ IMY ,
WCX ∈ IMCX , WCY ∈ IMCY for IMα , which is defined as
{0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}, that satisfies,
Pr{X̂K , Ŷ K 6= XK , Y K} ≤  (10)
H(X|Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WX) ≤ 1
K
logMX ≤ H(X|Y ) + 0 (11)
H(Y |X)− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WY ) ≤ 1
K
logMY ≤ H(Y |X) + 0 (12)
I(X;Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
(H(WCX) +H(WCY ))
≤ 1
K
(logMCX + logMCY ) ≤ I(X;Y ) + 0 (13)
1
K
H(XK |WY ) ≥ H(X)− 0 (14)
1
K
H(Y K |WX) ≥ H(Y )− 0 (15)
We can see that (11) - (13) mean
H(X,Y )− 30 ≤ 1
K
(H(WX) +H(WY ) +H(WCX)
+ H(WCY ))
≤ H(X,Y ) + 30 (16)
Hence from (10), (16) and the ordinary source coding
theorem, (WX , WY , WCX , WCY ) have no redundancy for
sufficiently small 0 ≥ 0. It can also be seen that WX and
WY are independent of Y K and XK respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1:
As seen by Slepian and Wolf, mentioned by Yamamoto
[1] there exist MX codes for the PY |X(y|x) DMC (discrete
memoryless channel) and MY codes for the PX|Y (x|y) DMC.
The codeword sets exist as CXi and C
Y
j , where C
X
i is a subset
of the typical sequence of XK and CYj is a subset of the
typical sequence of Y K . The encoding functions are similar,
but we have created one decoding function as there is one
decoder at the receiver:
fXi : IMCX → CXi (17)
fY j : IMCY → CYj (18)
g : XK , Y K → IMCX × IMCY (19)
The relations for MX , MY and the common information
remain the same as per Yamamoto’s and will therefore not be
proven here.
In this scheme, we use the average (VCX , VX , VCY , VY )
transmitted for many codewords from X and Y . Thus, at any
time either VCX or VCY is transmitted. Over time, the split
between which common information portion is transmitted
is determined and the protocol is prearranged accordingly.
Therefore all the common information is either transmitted
as l or m, and as such Yamamoto’s encoding and decoding
method may be used.
As per Yamamoto’s method the code does exist and that
WX and WY are independent of Y and X respectively, as
shown by Yamamoto [1].
4The common information is important in this model as
the sum of VCX and VCY represent a common information
between the sources. The following theorem holds for this
common information:
Theorem 1:
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )] = I(X;Y ) (20)
where VCX is the common portion between X and Y pro-
duced by XK and VCY is the common portion between X and
Y produced by Y K . It is noted that the (20) holds asymptoti-
cally, and does not hold with equality when K is finite. Here,
we show the approximation when K is infinitely large. The
private portions for XK and Y K are represented as VX and VY
respectively. As explained in Yamamoto’s [1] Theorem 1, two
types of common information exist (the first is represented by
I(X;Y ) and the second by min(H(XK), H(Y K)). We will
develop part of this idea to show that the sum of the common
information portions produced by XK and Y K in this new
model is represented by the mutual information between the
sources.
Proof of Theorem 1: The first part is to prove that
H(VCX) +H(VCY ) ≥ I(X;Y ), and is done as follows. We
weaken the conditions (1) and (2) to
Pr {XK , Y K 6= GXY (VX , VY , VCX , VCY }) ≤ δ1 (21)
For any (VX ,VY , VCX , VCY ) ∈ C(30) (which can be seen
from (16)), we have from (21) and the ordinary source coding
theorem that
H(XK , Y K)− δ1 ≤ 1
K
H(VX , VY , VCX , VCY )
≤ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VY ) +H(VCX)
+ H(VCY )] (22)
where δ1 → 0 as δ → 0. From Lemma 1,
1
K
H(VY |XK) ≥ 1
K
H(VY )− δ (23)
1
K
H(VX |Y K) ≥ 1
K
H(VX)− δ (24)
From (22) - (24),
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )] ≥ H(X,Y )− 1
K
H(VX)
− 1
K
H(VY )− δ1
≥ H(X,Y )− 1
K
H(VX |Y )
− 1
K
H(VY |X)− δ1 − 2δ(25)
On the other hand, we can see that
1
K
H(XK , VY ) ≤ H(X,Y ) + δ (26)
This implies that
1
K
H(VY |XK) ≤ H(Y |X) + δ (27)
and
1
K
H(VX |Y K) ≤ H(X|Y ) + δ (28)
From (25), (27) and (28) we get
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )] ≥ H(X,Y )−H(X|Y )−H(Y |X)
− δ1 − 4δ
= I(X;Y )− δ1 − 4δ (29)
It is possible to see from (13) that H(VCX) +H(VCY ) ≤
I(X;Y ). From this result, (19) and (29), and as δ1 → 0 and
δ → 0 it can be seen that
1
K
[H(VCX +H(VCY )] = I(X;Y ) (30)
This model can cater for a scenario where a particular
source, say X needs to be more secure than Y (possibly
because of eavesdropping on the X channel). In such a
case, the 1KH(VCX) term in (29) needs to be as high as
possible. When this uncertainty is increased then the security
of X is increased. Another security measure that this model
incorporates is that X cannot be determined from wiretapping
only X’s link.
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In order to determine the security of the system, a measure
for the amount of information leaked has been developed.
This is a new notation and quantification, which emphasizes
the novelty of this work. The obtained information and total
uncertainty are used to determine the leaked information.
Information leakage is indicated by LPQ. Here P indicates the
source/s for which information leakage is being quantified,
P = {S1, . . . , Sn} where n is the number of sources (in
this case, n = 2). Further, Q indicates the syndrome portion
that has been wiretapped, Q = {V1, . . . , Vm} where m is the
number of codewords (in this case, m = 4).
The information leakage bounds are as follows:
LX
K
VX ,VY ≤ H(XK)−H(VCX)−H(VCY ) + δ (31)
LX
K
VCX ,VCY ≤ H(XK)−H(VX)−H(VCY ) + δ (32)
LX
K
VCX ,VCY ,VY ≤ H(XK)−H(VX)−H(VCY ) + δ (33)
H(VCY )− δ ≤ LXKVY ,VCY
≤ H(XK)−H(VCX)−H(VX) + δ (34)
Here, VY is private information of source Y K and is inde-
pendent of XK and therefore does not leak any information
about XK , shown in (32) and (33). Equation (34) gives an
indication of the minimum and maximum amount of leaked
information for the interesting case where a syndrome has been
wiretapped and its information leakage on the alternate source
is quantified. The outstanding common information component
5is the maximum information that can be leaked. For this case,
the common information VCX and VCY can thus consist of
added protection to reduce the amount of information leaked.
These bounds developed in (31) - (34) are proven in the next
section.
The proofs for the above mentioned information leakage
inequalities are now detailed. First, the inequalities in (6) -
(9) will be proven, so as to prove that the information leakage
equations hold.
Lemma 2: The code (VX , VCX , VCY , VY ) defined at
the beginning of Section I, describing the model and (1) -
(5) satisfy (6) - (9). Then the information leakage bounds are
given by (31) - (34).
Proof for (6):
1
K
H(XK |VX , VY )
=
1
K
[H(XK , VX , VY )−H(VX , VY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VY )−H(VX , VY )] (35)
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) + I(XK ;VY ) +H(VY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VX |VY ) + I(VX ;VY ) +H(VY |VX)]
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) +H(VY |XK)−H(VX |VY )
−H(VY |VX)]
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(VY )−H(VX)−H(VY )] (36)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VX)]
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VX)]− δ
=
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )]− δ (37)
where (35) holds because VX is a function of X and (36)
holds because X is independent of VY asymptotically and VX
is independent of VY asymptotically.
For the proofs of (7) and (8), the following simplification
for H(X|VCY ) is used:
H(XK |VCY ) = H(XK , Y K)−H(VCY )
= H(XK) +H(VCY )− I(X;VCY )−H(VCY )
= H(XK) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )−H(VCY )
+ δ1 (38)
= H(XK)−H(VCY ) = δ1 (39)
where I(X;VCY ) approximately equal to H(VCY ) in (38)
can be seen intuitively from the Venn diagram in Figure
3. Since it is an approximation, δ1, which is smaller than
δ in the proofs below has been added to cater for the tolerance.
Proof for (7):
1
K
H(XK |VCX , VCY )
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCX , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )] (40)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) + I(X;VCY ) +H(VCY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VCX |VCY ) + I(VCX ;VCY ) +H(VCY |VCX)]
+ δ1
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) +H(VCY )−H(VCX)−H(VCY )]
+ δ1 (41)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )−H(VCX)] + δ1
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )−H(VCX)]− δ
=
1
K
H(VX) + δ1 − δ (42)
where (40) holds because VCX is a function of XK and
(41) holds because X is independent of VCY asymptotically
and VCX is independent of VCY asymptotically.
The proof for H(X|VCX , VCY , VY ) is similar to that for
H(X|VCX , VCY ), because VY is independent of X .
Proof for (8):
1
K
H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY )
=
1
K
H(XK |VCX , VCY ) (43)
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCX , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )] (44)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) + I(X;VCY ) +H(VCY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VCX |VCY ) + I(VCX ;VCY ) +H(VCY |VCX)]
+ δ1
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) +H(VCY )−H(VCX)
− H(VCY )] + δ1 (45)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )−H(VCX)] + δ1
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )
− −H(VCX)]− δ + δ1
=
1
K
H(VX)− δ + δ1 (46)
where (43) holds because VY and XK are independent,
(44) holds because VCX is a function of XK and (45) holds
because XK is independent of VCY asymptotically and VCX
is independent of VCY asymptotically.
For the proof of (9), we look at the following probabilities:
Pr{VX , VCX 6= G(TX)} ≤ δ (47)
6Pr{VY , VCY 6= G(TY )} ≤ δ (48)
1
K
H(XK |TY )
≤ 1
K
H(XK , VCY , VY )] + δ (49)
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY , VY )−H(VCY , VY )] + δ
=
1
K
[H(XK , VY )−H(VCY , VY )] + δ (50)
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) + I(XK ;VY ) +H(VY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VCY |VY ) + I(VCY ;VY ) +H(VY |VCY )] + δ
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(VY )−H(VCY )−H(VY )] + δ (51)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )] + δ (52)
where (49) holds from (48), (50) holds because VCY and
VY are asymptotically independent. Furthermore, (51) holds
because VCY and VY are asymptotically independent and XK
and VY are asymptotically independent.
Following a similar proof to those done above in this
section, another bound for H(XK |VCY , VY ) can be found as
follows:
1
K
H(XK |VCY , VY )
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY , VY )−H(VCY , VY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VY )−H(VCY , VY )] (53)
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) + I(XK ;VY ) +H(VY |X)]
− 1
K
[H(VCY |VY ) + I(VCY ;VY ) +H(VY |VCY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(VY )−H(VCY )−H(VY )] (54)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )]
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )]− δ
=
1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX)]− δ (55)
where (53) and (54) hold for the same reason as (50) and
(51) respectively.
Since we consider the information leakage as the total
information obtained subtracted from the total uncertainty, the
following hold for the four cases considered in this section:
LX
K
VX ,VY = H(X
K)−H(XK |VX , VY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VCX)−H(VCY ) + δ (56)
which proves (31).
LX
K
VCX ,VCY = H(X
K)−H(XK |VCX , VCY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VX) + δ (57)
which proves (32).
LX
K
VCX ,VCY ,VY = H(X
K)−H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VX) + δ (58)
which proves (33).
The two bounds for H(VCY , VY ) are given by (52) and
(55). From (52):
LX
K
VY ,VCY ≥ H(XK)− [H(X)−H(VCY ) + δ]
≥ H(VCY )− δ (59)
and from (55):
LX
K
VY ,VCY ≤ H(XK)− (H(VX) +H(VCX)− δ)
≤ H(XK)−H(VX)−H(VCX) + δ (60)
Combining these results from (59) and (60) gives (34).
IV. SHANNON’S CIPHER SYSTEM
Here, we discuss Shannon’s cipher system for two indepen-
dent correlated sources (depicted in Figure 4). The two source
outputs are i.i.d random variables X and Y , taking on values
in the finite sets X and Y . Both the transmitter and receiver
have access to the key, a random variable, independent of XK
and Y K and taking values in IMk = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Mk − 1}.
The sources XK and Y K compute the ciphertexts X
′
and
Y
′
, which are the result of specific encryption functions on the
plaintext from X and Y respectively. The encryption functions
are invertible, thus knowing X
′
and the key, XK can be
retrieved.
The mutual information between the plaintext and ciphertext
should be small so that the wiretapper cannot gain much in-
formation about the plaintext. For perfect secrecy, this mutual
information should be zero, then the length of the key should
be at least the length of the plaintext.
XK Y K
kk
Y
′
X
′
k
XˆK , Yˆ K
Encoder Encoder
Decoder
Figure 4. Shannon cipher system for two correlated sources
The encoder functions for X and Y , (EX and EY respec-
tively) are given as:
7EX : XK × IMkX → IM ′X = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′X − 1}
IM ′CX = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′CX − 1}(61)
EY : YK × IMkY → IM ′Y = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′Y − 1}
IM ′CY = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′CY − 1}(62)
The decoder is defined as:
DXY : (IM ′X , IM ′Y , IM ′CX , IM ′CY ) × IMkX , IMkY
→ XK × YK (63)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
W1 = FEX (X
K ,WkX) (64)
W2 = FEY (Y
K ,WkY ) (65)
X̂K = FDX (W1,W2,WkX) (66)
Ŷ K = FDY (W1,W2,WkY ) (67)
or
(X̂K , Ŷ K) = FDXY (W1,W2,WkX ,WkY ) (68)
The following conditions should be satisfied for cases 1- 4:
1
K
logMX ≤ RX +  (69)
1
K
logMY ≤ RY +  (70)
1
K
logMkX ≤ RkX +  (71)
1
K
logMkY ≤ RkY +  (72)
Pr{X̂K 6= XK} ≤  (73)
Pr{Ŷ K 6= Y K} ≤  (74)
1
K
H(XK |W1) ≤ hX +  (75)
1
K
H(Y K |W2) ≤ hY +  (76)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1) ≤ hXY +  (77)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W2) ≤ hXY +  (78)
where RX is the the rate of source X’s channel and RY
is the the rate of source Y ’s channel. Here, RkX is the rate
of the key channel at XK and RkY is the rate of the key
channel at Y K . The security levels, which are measured by
the total and individual uncertainties are hXY and (hX , hY )
respectively.
The cases 1 - 5 are:
Case 1: When TX and TY are leaked and both XK and Y K
need to be kept secret.
Case 2: When TX and TY are leaked and XK needs to be
kept secret.
Case 3: When TX is leaked and both XK and Y K need to
be kept secret.
Case 4: When TX is leaked and Y K needs to be kept secret.
Case 5: When TX is leaked and XK needs to be kept secret.
where TX is the syndrome produced by X , containing VCX
and VX and TY is the syndrome produced by Y , containing
VCY and VX .
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as
follows:
Definition 1a: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible
for case 1 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY ,
FDXY ) such that (69) - (74) and (78) hold for any → 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX ) is admissible for
case 2 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) such that (69) -
(75) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1c: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible
for case 3 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY ,
FDXY ) such that (69) - (74) and (76), (78) hold for any
→ 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1d: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for
case 4 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) such that (69) -
(74) and (76) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1e: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX ) is admissible for
case 5 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) such that (69) -
(74) and (75) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions of Rj and of Rk
are defined as:
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1} (79)
R2(hX) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX) is admissible for case 2} (80)
8R3(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 3} (81)
R4(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 4} (82)
R5(hX) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX) is admissible for case 5} (83)
Theorems for these regions have been developed:
Theorem 2: For 0 ≤ hXY ≤ H(X,Y ),
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX ≥ hXY and RkY ≥ hXY } (84)
Theorem 3: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X),
R2(hX) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX ≥ hX and RkY ≥ hY } (85)
Theorem 4: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X) and 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y ),
R3(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX ≥ hX and RkY ≥ hY } (86)
Theorem 5: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X),
R5(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX ≥ hX and RkY ≥ 0} (87)
When hX = 0 then case 5 can be reduced to that depicted
in (86). Hence, Corollary 1 follows:
Corollary 1: R4(hY ) = R3(0, hY )
The security levels, which are measured by the total and
individual uncertainties hXY and (hX , hY ) respectively give
an indication of the level of uncertainty in knowing certain
information. When the uncertainty increases then less infor-
mation is known to an eavesdropper and there is a higher level
of security.
V. PROOF OF THEOREMS 2 - 5
This section initially proves the direct parts of Theorems 2
- 5 and thereafter the converse parts.
A. Direct parts
All the channel rates in the theorems above are in accor-
dance with Slepian-Wolf’s theorem, hence there is no need to
prove them. We construct a code based on the prototype code
(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ) in Lemma 1. In order to include a
key in the prototype code, WX is divided into two parts as
per the method used by Yamamoto [1]:
WX1 =WX mod MX1 ∈ IMX1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX1 − 1} (88)
WX2 =
WX −WX1
MX1
∈ IMX2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX2 − 1} (89)
where MX1 is a given integer and MX2 is the ceiling
of MX/MX1. The MX/MX1 is considered an integer for
simplicity, because the difference between the ceiling value
and the actual value can be ignored when K is sufficiently
large. In the same way, WY is divided:
WY 1 =WY mod MY 1 ∈ IMY 1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 1 − 1} (90)
WY 2 =
WY −WY 1
MY 1
∈ IMY 2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 2 − 1} (91)
The common information components WCX and WCY
are already portions and are not divided further. It can be
shown that when some of the codewords are wiretapped the
uncertainties of XK and Y K are bounded as follows:
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WY ) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − ′0 (92)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − ′0 (93)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y )− ′0 (94)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (95)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (96)
1
K
H(XK |WY ,WCY ) ≥ H(X|Y ) + 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (97)
1
K
H(Y K |WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (98)
where 
′
0 → 0 as 0 → 0. The proofs for (92) - (98) are
the same as per Yamamoto’s [1] proof in Lemma A1. The
9difference is that WCX , WCY , MCX and MCY are described
as WC1, WC2, MC1 and MC2 respectively by Yamamoto.
Here, we consider that WCX and WCY are represented by
Yamamoto’s WC1 and WC2 respectively. In addition there are
some more inequalities considered here:
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ,WY 2) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
− ′0 (99)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 − ′0(100)
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMX1
+
1
K
logMCX − ′0 (101)
1
K
H(Y K |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 +
1
K
logMCX
− ′0 (102)
The inequalities (99) and (100) can be proved in the same
way as per Yamamoto’s [1] Lemma A2, and (101) and (102)
can be proved in the same way as per Yamamoto’s [1] Lemma
A1.
For each proof we consider cases where a key already exists
for either VCX or VCY and the encrypted common information
portion is then used to mask the other portions (either VCX or
VCY and the private information portions). There are two cases
considered for each; firstly, when the common information
portion entropy is greater than the entropy of the portion
that needs to be masked, and secondly when the common
information portion entropy is less than the entropy of the
portion to be masked. For the latter case, a smaller key will
need to be added so as to cover the portion entirely. This
has the effect of reducing the required key length, which is
explained in greater detail in Section VII.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose that (RX , RY , RKX ,
RKY ) ∈ R1 for hXY ≤ H(X,Y ). Without loss of generality,
we assume that hX ≤ hY . Then, from (84)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (103)
RkX ≥ hXY , RkY ≥ hXY (104)
Assuming a key exists for VCY . For the first case, consider
the following: H(VCY ) ≥ H(VX), H(VCY ) ≥ H(VY ) and
H(VCY ) ≥ H(VCX).
MCY = 2
KhXY (105)
The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX and WkY
are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕WkCY ,WX2 ⊕WkCY ,WCX ⊕WkCY )(106)
WY = (WY 1 ⊕WkCY ,WY 2 ⊕WkCY ,WCY ) (107)
WkY = (WkCY ) (108)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (11) -
(13) and (103) - (105), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (109)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
logMCY
= hXY (110)
≤ RkX (111)
where (110) comes from (105).
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
logMCY
= hXY (112)
≤ RkY (113)
where (112) comes from (105).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕WkCY ,
WX2 ⊕WkCY ,WCX ⊕WkCY ,
WY 1 ⊕WkCY ,WY 2 ⊕WkCY ,
WCY )
= H(XK) (114)
≥ hX − ′0 (115)
where (114) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and WCY is covered by an existing
random number key. Equations (10) - (16) imply that WX1,
WX2, WY 1 and WY 2 have almost no redundancy and they are
mutually independent.
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Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (116)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (109) - (116).
Next the case where: H(VCY ) < H(VX), H(VCY ) <
H(VY ) and H(VCY ) < H(VCX) is considered. Here, there
are shorter length keys used in addition to the key provided
by WCY in order to make the key lengths required by the
individual portions. For example the key Wk1 comprises
WkCY and a short key W1, which together provide the length
of WX1. The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX
and WkY are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕Wk1,WX2 ⊕Wk2,WCX ⊕Wk3) (117)
WY = (WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,WCY ) (118)
WkX = (Wk1,Wk2,Wk3) (119)
WkY = (Wk4,Wk5) (120)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (121)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
[logMk1 + logMk2 + logMk3]
= logMkCY + logM1
+ logMkCY + logM2
+ logMkCY + logM3
= 3 logMkCY + logM1
+ logM2 + logM3
≥ 3hXY − 0 (122)
≥ hXY (123)
where (122) results from (105).
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
[logMk3 + logMk4 + logMkCY ]
= logMkCY + logM3 + logMkCY
+ logM4 + logMkCY
= 3 logMkCY + logM3 + logM4 (124)
≥ 3hXY − 0 (125)
≥ hXY (126)
where (125) results from (105).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕Wk1,WX2 ⊕Wk2,
WCX ⊕Wk3,
WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,
WCY )
= H(XK) (127)
≥ hX − ′0 (128)
where (114) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and some shorter length key and
WCY is covered by an existing random number key.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (129)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (121) - (129).
Theorem 3 - 5 are proven in the same way with varying
codewords and keys. The proofs follow:
Theorem 3 proof:
The consideration for the security levels is that hY ≥ hX
because Y contains the key the is used for masking. Suppose
that (RX , RY , RKX , RKY ) ∈ R2. From (85)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (130)
RkX ≥ hX , RkY ≥ hY (131)
Assuming a key exists for VCY . For the first case, consider
the following: H(VCY ) ≥ H(VX), H(VCY ) ≥ H(VY ) and
H(VCY ) ≥ H(VCX).
MCY = 2
KhY (132)
The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX and WkY
are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕WkCY ,WX2 ⊕WkCY ,WCX ⊕WkCY )(133)
WY = (WY 1 ⊕WkCY ,WY 2 ⊕WkCY ,WCY ) (134)
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WkY = (WkCY ) (135)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (11) -
(13) and (130) - (132), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (136)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
logMCY
= hY (137)
≥ hX − 0 (138)
RkX (139)
where (137) comes from (132) and (138) comes form the
consideration stated at the beginning of this proof.
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
logMCY
= hXY (140)
≤ RkY (141)
where (140) comes from (132).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕WkCY ,
WX2 ⊕WkCY ,WCX ⊕WkCY ,
WY 1 ⊕WkCY ,WY 2 ⊕WkCY ,
WCY )
= H(XK) (142)
≥ hX − ′0 (143)
where (167) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and WCY is covered by an existing
random number key. Equations (10) - (16) imply that WX1,
WX2, WY 1 and WY 2 have almost no redundancy and they are
mutually independent.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (144)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (109) - (116).
Next the case where: H(VCY ) < H(VX), H(VCY ) <
H(VY ) and H(VCY ) < H(VCX) is considered. Here, there
are shorter length keys used in addition to the key provided
by WCY in order to make the key lengths required by the
individual portions. For example the key Wk1 comprises
WkCY and a short key W1, which together provide the length
of WX1. The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX
and WkY are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕Wk1,WX2 ⊕Wk2,WCX ⊕Wk3) (145)
WY = (WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,WCY ) (146)
WkX = (Wk1,Wk2,Wk3) (147)
WkY = (Wk4,Wk5) (148)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (149)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
[logMk1 + logMk2 + logMk3]
= logMkCY + logM1 + logMkCY
+ logM2 + logMkCY + logM3
= 3 logMkCY + logM1 + logM2 + logM3
≥ 3hY − 0 (150)
≥ 3hX − 0
≥ hX (151)
where (150) results from (132) and the result is from the
consideration at the beginning of this proof.
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
[logMk3 + logMk4 + logMkCY ]
= logMkCY + logM3 + logMkCY
+ logM4 + logMkCY
= 3 logMkCY + logM3 + logM4
≥ 3hY − 0 (152)
≥ hY (153)
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where (152) results from (132).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕Wk1,
WX2 ⊕Wk2,WCX ⊕Wk3,
WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,
WCY )
= H(XK) (154)
≥ hX − ′0 (155)
where (154) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and some shorter length key and
WCY is covered by an existing random number key.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (156)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (121) - (129).
Proof of Theorem 4:
Again, the consideration for the security levels is that
hY ≥ hX because Y contains the key the is used for masking.
Suppose that (RX , RY , RKX , RKY ) ∈ R3. From (85)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (157)
RkX ≥ hX , RkY ≥ hY (158)
Assuming a key exists for VCY . For the first case, consider
the following: H(VCY ) ≥ H(VX), H(VCY ) ≥ H(VY ) and
H(VCY ) ≥ H(VCX).
MCY = 2
KhY (159)
In the same way as theorem 2 and 3, the codewords WX
and WY and their keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕WkCY ,WX2 ⊕WkCY ,WCX ⊕WkCY )(160)
WY = (WY 1 ⊕WkCY ,WY 2 ⊕WkCY ,WCY ) (161)
WkY = (WkCY ) (162)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (163)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
logMCY
= hY (164)
≥ hX − 0 (165)
RkX (166)
where (164) comes from (159) and (165) comes form the
consideration stated at the beginning of this proof.
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
logMCY
= hXY (167)
≤ RkY (168)
where (167) comes from (159).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕WkCY , (169)
WX2 ⊕WkCY ,WCX ⊕WkCY ,
WY 1 ⊕WkCY ,WY 2 ⊕WkCY ,
WCY )
= H(XK) (170)
≥ hX − ′0 (171)
where (170) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and WCY is covered by an existing
random number key. Equations (10) - (16) imply that WX1,
WX2, WY 1 and WY 2 have almost no redundancy and they are
mutually independent.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (172)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (109) - (116).
Next the case where: H(VCY ) < H(VX), H(VCY ) <
H(VY ) and H(VCY ) < H(VCX) is considered. Here, there
are shorter length keys used in addition to the key provided
by WCY in order to make the key lengths required by the
individual portions. For example the key Wk1 comprises
WkCY and a short key W1, which together provide the length
of WX1. The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX
and WkY are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕Wk1,WX2 ⊕Wk2,WCX ⊕Wk3) (173)
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WY = (WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,WCY ) (174)
WkX = (Wk1,Wk2,Wk3) (175)
WkY = (Wk4,Wk5) (176)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1
+ logMX2 + logMCX)
+
1
K
(logMY 1 + logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X) + I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (177)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
[logMk1 + logMk2 + logMk3]
= logMkCY + logM1 + logMkCY
+ logM2 + logMkCY + logM3
= 3 logMkCY + logM1 + logM2 + logM3
≥ 3hY − 0 (178)
≥ 3hX − 0
≥ hX (179)
where (178) results from (159) and the result is from the
consideration at the beginning of this proof.
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
[logMk3 + logMk4 + logMkCY ]
= logMkCY + logM3 + logMkCY
+ logM4 + logMkCY
= 3 logMkCY + logM3 + logM4
≥ 3hY − 0 (180)
≥ hY (181)
where (209) results from (159).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕Wk1, (182)
WX2 ⊕Wk2,WCX ⊕Wk3,
WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,
WCY )
= H(XK) (183)
≥ hX − ′0 (184)
where (183) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and some shorter length key and
WCY is covered by an existing random number key.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (185)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (177) - (185).
The region indicated for R4 is derived from this region for
R3, when hX = 0.
Proof of Theorem 5: As before, VCY may be used as
a key, however here we use VCX as the key in this proof to
show some variation.
Now the consideration for the security levels is that hX ≥
hY because X contains the key that is used for masking.
Suppose that (RX , RY , RKX , RKY ) ∈ R5. From (85)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (186)
RkX ≥ hX , RkY ≥ hY (187)
Assuming a key exists for VCX . For the first case, consider
the following: H(VCX) ≥ H(VX), H(VCX) ≥ H(VY ) and
H(VCX) ≥ H(VCX).
MCX = 2
KhX (188)
The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX and WkY
are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕WkCX ,WX2 ⊕WkCX ,WCX) (189)
WY = (WY 1 ⊕WkCX ,WY 2 ⊕WkCX ,WCY ⊕WkCX)(190)
WkX = (WkCX) (191)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
WkCX and WkCX is protected by a random number key.
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (192)
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1
K
logMkX =
1
K
logMCX
≥ hX − 0 (193)
RkX (194)
where (193) comes from (188).
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
logMCX
= hX (195)
≥ hY (196)
≤ RkY (197)
where (196) comes from (188) and (196) comes form the
consideration stated at the beginning of this proof.
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕WkCX ,
WX2 ⊕WkCX ,WCX ,WCY ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1 ⊕WkCX ,WY 2 ⊕WkCX)
= H(XK) (198)
≥ hX − ′0 (199)
where (170) holds because WX1, WX2, WCX , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCY and WCY is covered by an existing
random number key. Equations (10) - (16) imply that WX1,
WX2, WY 1 and WY 2 have almost no redundancy and they are
mutually independent.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (200)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (109) - (116).
Next the case where: H(VCX) < H(VX), H(VCX) <
H(VY ) and H(VCX) < H(VCX) is considered. Here, there
are shorter length keys used in addition to the key provided
by WCX in order to make the key lengths required by
the individual portions. For example the key Wk1 comprises
WkCX and a short key W1, which together are the length of
WX1. The codewords WX and WY and their keys WkX and
WkY are now defined:
WX = (WX1 ⊕Wk1,WX2 ⊕Wk2,WCX) (201)
WY = (WCY ⊕Wk3,WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5) (202)
WkX = (Wk1,Wk2,Wk3) (203)
WkY = (Wk4,Wk5) (204)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WX2 and WCX from WX and WY 1,
WY 2 and WCY from WY as these are protected by the key
(WkCY .
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1
+ logMX2 + logMCX)
+
1
K
(logMY 1 + logMY 2
+ logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X) + I(X;Y )
+ 0
= H(X,Y )
≤ RX +RY (205)
1
K
logMkX =
1
K
[logMk1 + logMk2 + logMk3]
= logMkCX + logM1 + logMkCX
+ logM2 + logMkCX + logM3
= 3 logMkCX + logM1 + logM2 + logM3
≥ 3hX − 0 (206)
≥ hX (207)
where (206) results from (188).
1
K
logMkY =
1
K
[logMk3 + logMk4 + logMkCY ]
= logMkCX + logM3 + logMkCX
+ logM4 + logMkCX
= 3 logMkCX + logM3 + logM4
≥ 3hX − 0 (208)
≥ 3hY − 0 (209)
≥ hY (210)
where (208) results from (188) and (209) results from the
consideration at the beginning of this proof.
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ) = 1
K
H(X|WX1 ⊕Wk1,WX2 ⊕Wk2,
WCX ,WCY ⊕Wk3,
WY 1 ⊕Wk4,WY 2 ⊕Wk5,
WCY )
= H(XK) (211)
≥ hX − ′0 (212)
where (211) holds because WX1, WX2, WCY , WY 1, WY 2
are covered by key WCX and some shorter length key and
WCX is covered by an existing random number key.
Similarly,
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ) ≥ hY − ′0 (213)
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY , hXY ) is admissible
from (205) - (213).
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B. Converse parts
From Slepian-Wolf’s theorem we know that the channel rate
must satisfy RX ≥ H(X|Y ), RY ≥ H(Y |X) and RX+RY ≥
H(X,Y ) to achieve a low error probability when decoding.
Hence, the key rates are considered in this subsection.
Converse part of Theorem 2:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX|W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W1)]− 
=
1
K
[H((WkX|X,Y,W1) + I(WkX ;W1)
+ I(WkX ;X|Y,W1) + I(X,Y,WkX |W1)
+ I(Y,WkX |X,W1)− I(WkX ;W1)]− 
=
1
K
[H(X,Y |W1)−H(X,Y |W1,WkX)]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(X,Y |W1,WkX)−  (214)
= hXY −H(VCY )− 
= hXY −  (215)
where (214) results from equation (77). Here, we consider
the extremes of H(VCY ) in order to determine the limit for
RkX . When this quantity is minimum then we are able to
achieve the maximum bound of hXY .
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W2)]− 
=
1
K
[H((WkY |X,Y,W2) + I(WkY ;W2)
+ I(WkY ;X|Y,W2) + I(X,Y,WkY |W2)
+ I(Y,WkY |X,W2)− I(WkY ;W2)]− 
=
1
K
[H(X,Y |W2)−H(X,Y |W2,WkY )]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(X,Y |W2,WkY )−  (216)
= hXY −H(VCX)− 
= hXY −  (217)
where (216) results from equation (78). Here, we consider
the extremes of H(VCX) in order to determine the limit for
RkY . When this quantity is minimum then we are able to
achieve the maximum bound of hXY .
Converse part of Theorem 3:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX|W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W1)]− 
=
1
K
[H((WkX|X,W1) + I(WkX ;W1)
+ I(X,WkX |W1)− I(WkX ;W1)]− 
≥ 1
K
I(X,WkX |W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(X|W1)−H(X|W1,WkX)]− 
≥ hX −H(VCY )−  (218)
= hX −  (219)
where (218) results from (75). Here, we consider the ex-
tremes of H(VCY ) in order to determine the limit for RkX .
When this quantity is minimum then we are able to achieve
the maximum bound of hX .
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W2)]− 
=
1
K
[H((WkY |Y,W2) + I(WkY ;W2)
+ I(X,WkY |W2)− I(WkY ;W2)]− 
≥ 1
K
I(Y,WkY |W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(Y |W2)−H(Y |W2,WkY )]− 
≥ hY −H(VCX)−  (220)
= hY −  (221)
where (218) results from (76). Here, we consider the ex-
tremes of H(VCX) in order to determine the limit for RkY .
When this quantity is minimum then we are able to achieve
the maximum bound of hY .
Since theorems 4-5 also have key rates of hX and hY for
X and Y respectively we can use the same methods to prove
the converse.
VI. SCHEME FOR MULTIPLE SOURCES
The two correlated source model presented in Section II is
generalised even further, and now concentrates on multiple
correlated sources transmitting syndromes across multiple
wiretapped links. This new approach represents a network
scenario where there are many sources and one receiver. We
consider the information leakage for this model for Slepian-
Wolf coding and thereafter consider the Shannon’s cipher
system representation.
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A. Information leakage using Slepian-Wolf coding
Here, Figure 5 gives a pictorial view of the new extended
model for multiple correlated sources.
Receiver
S1 S2 Sn
TS1 TS2 TSn
Figure 5. Extended generalised model
Consider a situation where there are many sources, which
are part of the S set:
S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}
where i represents the ith source (i = 1, . . . , n) and there are
n sources in total. Each source may have some correlation
between some other source and all sources are part of a
binary alphabet. There is one receiver that is responsible
for performing decoding. The syndrome for a source Si is
represented by TSi , which is part of the same alphabet as the
sources.
The entropy of a source is given by a combination of a
specific conditional entropy and mutual information. In order
to present the entropy we first define the following sets:
- The set, S that contains all sources: S =
{S1, S2, . . . , Sn}.
- The set, St that contains t unique elements from S and
St ⊆ S, Si ∈ St, St ∪ Sct = S and |St| = t
Here, H(Si) is obtained as follows:
H(Si) = H(Si|S\Si) +
n∑
t=2
(−1)t−1
∑
all possible St
I(St|Sct)(222)
Here, n is the number of sources, H(Si|S\Si) denotes
the conditional entropy of the source Si given Si subtracted
from the set S and I(St|Sct) denotes the mutual information
between all sources in the subset St given the complement
of St. In the same way as for two sources, the generalised
probabilities and entropies can be developed. It is then possible
to decode the source message for source Si by receiving all
components related to Si. This gives rise to the following
inequality for H(Si) in terms of the sources:
H(Si|S\Si) +
n∑
t=2
(−1)t−1
∑
all possible St
I(St|Sct)
≤ H(Si) + δ (223)
In this type of model information from multiple links
need to be gathered in order to determine the transmitted
information for one source. Here, the common information
between sources is represented by the I(St|Sct) term. The
portions of common information sent by each source can be
determined upfront and is an arbitrary allocation in our case.
For example in a three source model where X , Y and Z
are the correlated sources, the common information shared
with X and the other sources is represented as: I(X;Y |Z)
and I(X;Z|Y ). Each common information portion is divided
such that the sources having access to it are able to produce a
portion of it themselves. The common information I(X;Y |Z)
is divided into VCX1 and VCY 1 where the former is the
common information between X and Y , produced by X and
the latter is the common information between X and Y ,
produced by Y . Similarly, I(X;Z|Y ) consists of two common
information portions, VCX2 and VCZ1 produced by X and Z
respectively.
As with the previous model for two correlated sources,
since wiretapping is possible there is a need to develop the
information leakage for the model. The information leakages
for this multiple source model is indicated in (224) and (225).
Remark 1: The leaked information for a source Si given the
transmitted codewords TSi , is given by:
LSiTSi
= I(Si;TSi) (224)
Since we use the notion that the information leakage is
the conditional entropy of the source given the transmit-
ted information subtracted from the source’s uncertainty (i.e
H(Si) −H(Si|TSi)), the proof for (224) is trivial. Here, we
note that the common information is the minimum amount of
information leaked. Each source is responsible for transmitting
its own private information and there is a possibility that this
private information may also be leaked. The maximum leakage
for this case is thus the uncertainty of the source itself, H(Si).
We also consider the information leakage for a source Si
when another source Sj(j 6=i) has transmitted information. This
gives rise to Remark 2.
Remark 2: The leaked information for a source Si given the
transmitted codewords TSj , where i 6= j is:
LSiTSj
= H(Si)−H(Si|TSj )
= H(Si)− [H(Si)− I(Si;TSj )]
= I(Si;TSj ) (225)
The information leakage for a source is determined based on
the information transmitted from any other channel using the
common information between them. The private information is
not considered as it is transmitted by each source itself and can
therefore not be obtained from an alternate channel. Remark
2 therefore gives an indication of the maximum amount of
information leaked for source Si, with knowledge of the
syndrome TSj .
These remarks show that the common information can
be used to quantify the leaked information. The common
information provides information for more than one source and
is therefore susceptible to leaking information about more than
one source should it be compromised. This subsection gives an
indication of the information leakage for the new generalised
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multiple correlated sources model when a source’s syndrome
and other syndromes are wiretapped.
B. Information leakage for Shannon’s cipher system
This subsection details a novel masking method to minimize
the key length and thereafter builds this multiple correlated
source model on Shannon’s cipher system.
The new masking method encompasses masking the condi-
tional entropy portion with a mutual information portion. By
masking, certain information is hidden and it becomes more
difficult to obtain the information that has been masked. Mask-
ing can typically be done using random numbers, however we
eliminate the need for random numbers that represent keys
and rather use a common information to mask with.
We make the following assumptions:
• The capacity of each link cannot be exhausted using this
method.
• A common information is used to mask certain private
information and can be used to mask multiple times.
Further, private information that needs to be masked
always exists in this method.
The allocation of common information for transmission are
done on an arbitrary basis. The objective of this subsection is
to minimize the key lengths while achieving perfect secrecy.
The private information for source i is given by H(Si|S\Si)
according to (222), which is called WSi and the common
information associated with source Si is given by WCSi . First,
choose a common information with which to mask. Then
we take a part of WSi , i.e. WSi
′
, that has entropy equal to
H(WCSi), and mask as follows:
W
′
Si ⊕WCSi (226)
When the two sequences are xor’ed the result is a single
sequence that may look different to the originals. We then
transmit the masked portion instead of the W
′
Si
portion when
transmitting WSi , thus providing added security. This brings
in the interesting factor that there are many possibilities for
a specific mutual information to mask conditional entropy
portions. For example when considering three sources as
before, it is possible to mask the private information for
X , Y and Z with the common portion I(X;Y ;Z). If Y is
secure then this common information can be transmitted along
Y ’s channel, ensuring the information is kept secure. The
ability to mask using the common information is a unique and
interesting feature of this new model for multiple correlated
sources. The underlying principle is that the secure link should
transmit more common information after transmitting their
private information.
We find that the lower bound for the channel rate when the
masking approach is used is given by:
RMi ≥ H(S1, . . . , Sn)−
n∑
t=2
∑
all possible St
(t− 1)I(St|Sct)(227)
where RMi is the ith channel rate when masking is used.
The method works theoretically but may result in some
concern practically as there may be a security compromise
when common information is sent across non secure links. We
see that if the WCSi component used for masking has been
compromised then the private portion it has masked will also
be compromised. A method to overcome this involves using
two common information parts for masking. Equation (226)
representing the masking would become:
W
′
Si ⊕WCSi ⊕WCSj (228)
where i 6= j and both WCSi and WCSj are common
information associated with source Si. This way, if only
WCSj is compromised then WSi is not compromised as it
is still protected by WCSi . Here, combinations of common
information are used to increase the security. The advantage
with (228) is that keys may be reused because common
information may be shared by more than one source. Further,
the method will not result in an increase in key length.
The Shannon’s cipher system for this multiple source model
is now presented in order to determine the rate regions for
perfect secrecy. The multiple sources each have their own
encoder and there is a universal decoder. Each source has an
encoder represented by:
Ei : S × IWSi → IWCSi = {0, 1, . . . ,WSi − 1}
IWCSi = {0, 1, . . . ,WCSi − 1}(229)
where IMPi is the alphabet representing the private portion for
source Si and IMCi is the alphabet representing the common
information for source Si. The decoder at the receiver is
defined as:
D : (IWSi , IWCSi ) × IMk → S (230)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
Wi = FEi(Si,Wki) (231)
Ŝi = FDi(Wi,Wki,W{kp}) (232)
where p = 1, . . . , n, p 6= i and W{kp} represents the set of
common information required to find Si, and Ŝi is the decoded
output.
The following conditions should be satisfied for the general
cases:
1
K
logWSi ≤ Ri +  (233)
1
K
logMki ≤ Rki +  (234)
Pr{Ŝi 6= Si} ≤  (235)
1
K
H(Si|Wi) ≤ hi −  (236)
1
K
H(Sj |Wi) ≤ hj −  (237)
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where Ri is the the rate of source Si’s channel and Rki
is the key rate of Si. The security levels, for source i and
any other source j are measured uncertainties hi and hj
respectively.
The general cases considered are:
Case 1: When TSi is leaked and Si needs to be kept secret.
Case 2: When TSi is leaked and Si and/or Sj needs to be
kept secret.
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as
follows:
Definition 1a: (Ri, Rki, hi) is admissible for case 1 if there
exists a code (FEi , FD) such that (233) - (236) hold for any
→ 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj , hj) is admissible for case
2 if there exists a code (FEi , FD) such that (233) - (235) and
(237) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions are defined as:
R(hi) = {(Ri, Rki) :
(Ri, Rki, hi) is admissible for case 1} (238)
R(hi, hj) = {(Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj) :
(Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj , hj) is admissible for case 2} (239)
The theorems developed for these regions follow:
Theorem 6: For 0 ≤ hi ≤ I(Si;Sn|Scn),
R1(hi) = {(Ri, Rki) :
Ri ≥ H(Si),
Rki ≥ I(St|Sct)} (240)
Theorem 7: For 0 ≤ hj ≤ H(Si, Sj),
R2(hi, hj) = {(Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj) :
Ri ≥ H(Si, Sj), Rj ≥ H(Si, Sj),
Rki ≥ I(Si;Sj) and Rkj ≥ I(Si;Sj)} (241)
The proofs for these theorems follow. The source informa-
tion components are first identified. Assume the private por-
tions of source i and j are given by Wi and Wj respectively.
Theorem 6 proof: Here, Ri ≥ H(Si), Rki ≥ I(St|Sct).
For the case where hi > I(St|Sct), the definitions for WCSi ,
Wi and Wki follow:
WCSi = 2
KI(St|Sct) (242)
Wi = (WPi,WkCi) (243)
Wki =WCi (244)
The keys and uncertainties are calculated as follows:
1
K
logMi =
1
K
(logWSi + logWCSi)
≤ H(Si|S\Si) +
1
K
WCSi + 0
= H(Si|S\Si) + I(St|Sct) + 0
=
1
K
H(Si) + 0
≤ Ri + 0 (245)
1
K
logMki
=
1
K
logWCSi
= I(St|Sct) (246)
≤ Rki + 0 (247)
1
K
H(Si|WPi,WCi)
≥ 1
K
H(Si)− ′0
= hi − ′0 (248)
From (245) - (248), (Ri, Rki, hi) is admissible for hi >
I(St|Sct)). We now consider the case where hi ≤ I(St|Sct))
and define WCSi , Wi and Wki as follows:
WCSi = 2
KI(St|Sct) (249)
Wi = (WPi,WkCi) (250)
Wki =WCi (251)
The keys and uncertainties are calculated as follows:
1
K
logMki
=
1
K
logWCSi
= I(St|Sct)) (252)
≤ Rki + 0 (253)
1
K
H(Si|WPi,WCi)
≥ 1
K
H(Si|WCi) + I(St|Sct)− 
′
0
= H(Si)− ′0
= hi − ′0 (254)
From (253) - (254) it is seen that (Ri, Rki, hi) is admissible
for hi ≤ I(St|Sct)).
Theorem 7 is proven in a similar manner.
Theorem 7 proof: Here, Ri ≥ H(Si, Sj), Rj ≥
H(Si, Sj), Rki ≥ I(Si;Sj) and Rkj ≥ I(Si;Sj). For the
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case where hj ≤ H(Si;Sj), the definitions for WCSi , MCj
Wi, Wki, Wj and Wkj follow:
WCSi = 2
KI(St|Sct) (255)
MCj = 2
KI(St|Sct) (256)
Wi = (WPi,WkCi) (257)
Wki =WCi (258)
Wj = (WPj ,WkCj) (259)
Wkj =WCj (260)
The keys and uncertainties are calculated as follows:
1
K
logMi =
1
K
(logWSi + logWCSi)
≤ 1
K
H(Si|S\Si) +
1
K
WCSi + 0
=
1
K
H(Si|S\Si) + I(St|Sct) + 0 (261)
=
1
K
H(Si) + 0
≤ Ri + 0 (262)
1
K
logMj =
1
K
(logMPj + logMCj)
≤ 1
K
H(Sj |S\Sj ) +
1
K
MCj + 0
=
1
K
H(Sj |S\Sj ) + I(Sj ;St|Sct) + 0(263)
=
1
K
H(Sj) + 0
≤ Rj + 0 (264)
1
K
logMki
=
1
K
logWCSi
= I(St|Sct) (265)
≤ Rki + 0 (266)
1
K
logMkj
=
1
K
logMCj
= I(Si;Sj) + 0 (267)
≤ Rki + 0 (268)
1
K
H(Sj |WPi,WCi)
≥ H(Sj)−H(Si)− ′0
= H(Si, Sj)−H(Si)− ′0
≥ hj −H(Si) (269)
= hj − hi − ′0 (270)
From (262) - (270), (Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj , hj) is admissible
for hj ≤ H(Si, Sj). We now consider the case where hj >
H(Si, Sj), and define WCSi , Wi and Wki as follows:
WCSi = 2
KI(St|Sct) (271)
MCj = 2
KI(St|Sct) (272)
Wi = (WPi,WkCi) (273)
Wki =WCi (274)
Wj = (WPj ,WkCj) (275)
Wkj =WCj (276)
The keys and uncertainties are calculated as follows:
1
K
logMki
=
1
K
logWCSi
= I(St|Sct) (277)
≤ Rki + 0 (278)
1
K
logMkj
≤ I(Si;Sj) + 0 (279)
≤ Rki + 0 (280)
1
K
H(Sj |WPi,WCi)
≤ H(Sj)−H(Si) + ′0
= H(Si, Sj)−H(Si) + ′0
≤ hj −H(Si) (281)
= hj − hi − ′0 (282)
From (278) - (251) it is seen that (Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj , hj) is
admissible for hj ≤ H(Si, Sj).
These theorems demonstrate the necessary rates required for
perfect secrecy. The goal of the Shannon’s cipher aspect was
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to reduce the key lengths. The masking method explained in
this section is able to use common information as keys and
therefore minimise the key rates for the general cases.
The information leakage described in the Slepian-Wolf
aspect indicates the common information that should be given
added protection to ensure that even less information will be
leaked. The new extended model presented here also incorpo-
rates a multiple correlated sources approach using Shannon’s
cipher system, which is more practical than looking at two
sources.
VII. COMPARISON TO OTHER MODELS
The two correlated sources model across a channel with
an eavesdropper is a more generalised approach of Ya-
mamoto’s [1] model. If we were to combine the links into one
link, we would have the same situation as per Yamamoto’s
[1]. From Section VI it is evident that the model can be
implemented for multiple sources with Sahnnon’s cipher sys-
tem. Due to the unique scenario incorporating multiple sources
and multiple links, the new model is more secure as private
information and common information from other link/s are
required for decoding.
Further, information at the sources may be more secure in
the new model because if one source is compromised then
only one source’s information is known. In Yamamoto’s [1]
method both source’s information is contained at one station
and when that source is compromised then information about
both sources are known. The information transmitted along the
channels (i.e. the syndromes) do not have a fixed length as per
Yamamoto’s [1] method. Here, the syndrome length may vary
depending on the encoding procedure and nature of Slepian-
Wolf codes, which is another feature of this generalised model.
The generalised model also has the advantage that varying
amounts of the common information VCX and VCY (in the
case of two sources) may be transmitted depending on the
security of the transmission link and/or sources. For example,
for two correlated sources, if Y ’s channel is not secure we can
specify that more of the common information is transmitted
from X . In this way we’re able to make better use of the
transmission link’s security. For Yamamoto’s [1] method the
common information was transmitted as one portion, VC .
In this model, information from more than one link is
required in order to determine the information for one source.
This gives rise to added security as even if one link is
wiretapped it is not possible to determine the contents of a
particular source. This is attributed to the fact that this model
has separate common information portions, which is different
to Yamamoto’s model.
Another major feature is that private information can be
hidden using common information. Here, common information
produced by a source may be used to mask its private
codeword thus saving on key length. The key allocation is
specified by general rules presented in Section VI. The multi-
ple correlated sources model presents a combination masking
scheme where more than one common information is used to
protect a private information, which is a practical approach.
This is an added feature developed in order to protect the
system. This approach has not been considered in the other
models mentioned in this section.
The work by Yang et al. [8] uses the concept of side in-
formation to assist the decoder in determining the transmitted
message. The side information could be considered to be a
source and is related to this work when the side information
is considered as correlated information. Similar work with
side information that incorporates wiretappers, by Villard and
Piantanida [6] and Villard et al. [7] may be generalised in the
sense that side information can be considered to be a source,
however this new model is distinguishable as syndromes,
which are independent of one another are transmitted across
an error free channel in the new model. Further, to the author’s
knowledge Shannon’s cipher system has not been incorporated
into these models by Villard and Piantanida [6] and Villard et
al. [7].
VIII. FUTURE WORK
This work has room for expansion and future work. It
would be interesting to consider the case where the channel
capacity has certain constraints (according to the assumptions
in Section VI the channel capacity is enough at all times).
In the new model, the channels are either protected by keys
or not however this is limited and a real case scenario where
there are varying security levels for the channels is an avenue
for future work. Another aspect for expansion is to investigate
the allocation of common information as keys to minimize
additional keys with links having varying security levels and
limited capacity.
IX. CONCLUSION
The information leakage for two correlated sources across
a channel with an eavesdropper was initially considered.
Knowing which components contribute most to information
leakage aids in keeping the system more secure, as these
terms can be made more secure. The information leakage for
the two correlated source model was quantified and proven.
Shannon’s cipher system was also incorporated for this model
and channel and key rates to achieve perfect secrecy have
been provided. The two correlated sources model has been
extended for the network scenario where we consider multiple
sources transmitting information across multiple links. The
information leakage for this extended model is detailed. The
channel and key rates are also considered for the multiple
correlated source model when Shannon’s chipher system is im-
plemented. A masking method is further presented to minimize
key lengths and a combination masking method is presented
to address its practical shortcoming.
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